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Abstract
This paper considers the impact of tobacco consumption on wages in the UK using
data from ﬁfteen waves of the British Household Panel Survey. Considering both over-
all smoker status as well as the number of cigarettes consumed, we provide estimates
for the smoking wage penalty using standard regression methods, including panel es-
timators for ﬁxed eﬀects and panel instrumental variable estimators. Furthermore, we
analyse the impact of stopping and starting to smoke relative to permanent smokers
and non-smokers by Mahalanobis-matching. In the cross-section, we ﬁnd a rather
large wage penalty for smokers of about 4%. However, panel estimator and IV results
show relatively few support for hypotheses linking the smoking wage penalty to either
lower productivity of smokers, be it health related or not, or discrimination. Match-
ing results suggest that starting or stopping to smoke does not aﬀect later earnings
relative to remaining either smoker or non-smoker.
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11 Introduction
A number of studies have found a rather large wage penalty as high as 24% associated
with tobacco consumption. This papers tests several hypotheses regarding this smoking
wage penalty. Relying on data from the British Household Panel Survey (BHPS), we test
whether the wage penalty can be explained by either discrimination of smokers, productiv-
ity diﬀerences, worse health of smokers or whether there are unobserved factors related to
both smoking and lower earnings. Our ﬁndings do not support the ﬁrst three hypotheses,
but rather suggest that the smoking wage penalty is related to unobserved heterogeneity.
The fact that smokers seem to earn relatively less than non-smokers, even after ac-
counting for diﬀerences in observables, has been documented in a number of empirical
studies. In an early study using cross-sectional data from the 1973 Quality of Employment
Survey, Leigh and Berger (1989) ﬁnd no signiﬁcant relationship between either smoking
or being overweight and current earnings. Levine, Gustafson and Velenchick (1997) use
data from two waves of the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth for 1984 and 1992.
Their ﬁndings from two cross-sectional regressions and time and sibling-diﬀerenced models
show a 4% to 8% wage penalty for smokers with larger eﬀect being found for females.
Using data from the 1998, 1999 and 2001 waves of the German Socio-Economic Panel,
Heineck and Schwarze (2003) ﬁnd a wage penalty for smoking men in the cross-section
that disappears when controlling for unobserved heterogeneity. Using the 2002 wave of the
same data set, Anger and Kvasnicka (2006) compare current smokers with past-smokers
and never-smokers. Their results from OLS and 2SLS-estimations, using smoking at 16
and co-residence with a (former) smoker as instruments, reveal a 4% to 10% percent wage
penalty for current smokers and a 3% to 4% wage premium for past smokers.
There has also been a stream of papers analysing the impact of both drinking and
smoking (Auld 2005 for Canada, Lee 1999 and Lye and Hirschberg 2004 for Australia, van
Ours 2004 for the Netherlands). A general ﬁnding from this literature implies that while
positive eﬀects are found for drinking, smoking is generally related to an often large wage
penalty of about 10% with some estimates ranging as high as 24%. Recent research has
also focused on the labor market eﬀects of the consumption of other drugs (van Ours 2006,
2007)
There are four common hypotheses used to explain wage diﬀerences between smokers
2and non-smokers (see e.g. Levine, Gustafson and Velenchick 1997). First, there may be
discrimination against smokers. During the last decades, public opinion on smoking has
shifted from considering it as an everyday-activity to seeing it as an unhealthy distur-
bance with some researchers even speaking of outright hostility toward smokers (Levine,
Gustafson and Velenchick 1997, p. 493). As far as either superiors, customers or co-workers
object against working alongside smokers, it seems possible that smokers are only able to
ﬁnd work at lower wages as predicted by taste-discrimination (Becker 1957/1971). Simi-
larly, employers could consider smoking to be a signal of an individual’s lower productivity
or “inner strength” which may lead to statistical discrimination (Phelps 1973, Arrow 1973).
Second, there is evidence that smokers are indeed less productive than non-smokers
which might translate into earnings diﬀerences. For example, smokers may be less present
at their workplace due to smoking breaks which may be particularly problematic if the
production process involves work on assembly lines or work in teams. Some of the evidence
on this topic is summarized in Kristein (1983) who estimates the productivity costs of
smoking (in 1980 dollars) at between 80$ and 160$ per individual and year with additional
40$ to 80$ imposed by higher absenteeism.
Third, as smoking is adversely related to health, smokers may receive lower wages as
a consequence of lower productivity related to poorer health. One argument suggests that
the adverse health eﬀects of smoking directly reduce productivity as smokers are less able
to carry out physically demanding tasks like manual work. A similar argument suggests
that employers may only be willing to pay lower wages to smokers due to the latter’s
higher absence from work (see Kristein 1983, Bertera 1992, Ryan, Zwerling and Orav 1992
and Bush and Wooden 1995 for an analysis of the relationship between smoking and work
absenteeism).
Finally, there may be unobserved factors related to both smoking and lower wages.
Becker and Murphy (1988) and Becker, Grossman, and Murphy (1994) argue that smoking
may reﬂect a higher time preference rate as smoking may provide utility today with the
adverse eﬀects occurring much later in life. A higher time preference rate is then related
to diﬀerences in investment in education or training which in turn has consequences for
productivity and wages. Other possibilities include diﬀerences in the preferences for work
and leisure or diﬀerences in other unobservables. Note at that point that only the ﬁrst
3three hypotheses are related to causal eﬀects of smoking, while the last eﬀectively points
toward spurious correlation between smoking and wages in the cross-section that is caused
by omitted variables.
The contributions of this paper are as follows: First, we use for the ﬁrst time a long
panel that allows us to relate yearly changes in smoking behavior to wage changes over a
period of ﬁfteen years. This enables us to control for both time constant heterogeneity as
well as correlation between tobacco consumption and the contemporaneous error term using
panel (instrumental variables) estimators. As our data allows the use of past consumption
as an instrument for current consumption, our IV-estimates seem to be less problematic
than those reported in the previous literature (see the critical discussion of the validity of
instruments in Heineck and Schwarze 2003 and van Ours 2004). Furthermore, we use the
fact that we observe individuals over a long time to contrast individuals starting or stopping
to smoke with both permanent smokers and permanent non-smokers using Mahalanobis-
matching. Finally, as the public reaction to smokers diﬀers between countries, estimates for
another country may be helpful in disentangling the causes of the smoking wage penalty.
In this context, the UK is an interesting case as the British and American labor markets
are relatively similar, while the reaction to smokers may be expected to be stronger in the
US.
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the data used in this study.
The estimation strategy is lined out in section 3, while descriptive evidence is presented in
section 4. Econometric results are found in section 5. Section 6 concludes.
2 Data
This paper uses data for the years 1991 to 2005 from the ﬁrst ﬁfteen waves of the British
Household Panel Survey (BHPS), an annual survey currently carried out by the ESRC
UK Longitudinal Studies Centre within the Institute for Social and Economic Research
at the University of Essex.1 The target population of the ﬁrst wave of the survey were
adult members of households with a domestic residence in England, Scotland south of the
Caledonian Canal and Wales. In later waves, households that moved into Scotland north
1See http://www.iser.essex.ac.uk/ulsc/bhps/ for detailed information and documentation.
4of the Caledonian Canal or from domestic residence into institutions (excluding prisons)
were followed. Beginning with wave four, there has also been a youth survey targeted at
11 to 15 year old individuals that is not used in this paper.
While the original sample consisted of 8,167 household, new samples were added in
later years. From wave seven to wave eleven, a sub-sample of the original British European
Community Household Panel was incorporated. Additionally, boost-samples for Wales and
Scotland were added in in wave 9, while a Northern Ireland sample was added in wave 11.
In this paper, we focus on information on the individual level and use only some of the
available household information. Using information from all subsamples, we ﬁrst restrict
the sample to those in prime working age from 20 to 55 years. This allows us to largely
ignore issues like early-career on-the-job-training, while the restriction to 55 years provides
some protection against selectivity issues due to sick smokers dropping out of the labor
force. Furthermore, we restrict the sample to employees with a typical weekly working
time of at least 30 hours, excluding the self- and part-time employed. As there are a few
cases with rather extreme working hours, we drop the top 1%, eﬀectively resticting the
sample to those with a typical weekly working time between 30 and 60 hours.
After dropping cases with missing values and splitting the sample by gender, we arrive
at 33,313 observation for 6,647 individuals for the male sample and 23,546 observations for
5,611 individuals for the female sample. Detailed information on both sub-samples can be
found in tables 5 and 6 in the appendix. Note at this point that the data does not contain
information on alcohol or drug consumption.
3 Econometric model
In a ﬁrst step of the econometric investigation, we use the regression techniques usually
applied in the literature on the smoking wage penalty. To ﬁx ideas, consider a simple
Mincer-type earnings regression of the form
yit = β0Xit + τ ∗ sit + ηi + it, (1)
where yit is the log monthly wage in 1987 prices of individual i at time t, ηi is a person-
speciﬁc ﬁxed eﬀect and it is a error-term. Xit contains time-varying control variables,
5more speciﬁcally a third-order polynomial in age, the number of children and dummy-
variables for marital status, education, the number of employees at the workplace, union-
membership, employer-type (private company, local or central government), region of res-
idence, socio-economic class of the current job (including some control for industry) and
year of observation. Note that by including dummies for occupation class, we implicitly
rule out the possibility that discrimination against smokers prevents them from working
in certain occupations. However, as smokers are essentially found in (almost) all occupa-
tions and on all hierarchical levels, this assumption seems relatively innocuous. In some
(cross-sectional) speciﬁcations, we also include dummies for being of Indian, Pakistani or
Bangladeshi heritage and for being non-white. sit contains information on the smoking
behavior of the respective individual at time t and τ is our parameter of interest.
The ﬁrst measure of smoking behavior is a simple dummy variable, being “1” if a per-
son answers “yes” to the Question “Do you smoke cigarettes at all nowadays?” (wave I)
or “Do you smoke cigarettes?” (all other waves) and “0” otherwise. However, there are
various reasons why not only the pure fact that an individual smokes might be relevant for
wages, but that the quantity of tobacco consumption matters: First, adverse health eﬀects
are obviously stronger for heavy than for light smokers. Second, we might expect that a
potentially lower productivity of smokers due to a higher number of breaks is directly re-
lated to the number of cigarettes smoked during the day. Similarly, possible discrimination
obviously depends on the possibility that co-workers are aware of an individual’s smok-
ing behavior which seems more likely the more an individual smokes. To capture these
possible eﬀects, we use a second measure of tobacco consumption, speciﬁcally the number
of cigarettes typically smoked per day. To allow for non-linear eﬀects, we also include a
squared term.
Note that there are several econometric problems when trying to identify τ. First, as
already noted there may be unobserved factors, e.g. time preference rates or other prefer-
ences, that are correlated with both smoking and wages. As far as these can be treated
as time-constant, the use of ﬁxed eﬀect panel estimators allows consistent estimation of τ.
However, while this seems to be an innocuous assumption when dealing with preferences,
there is also a second source of endogeneity. If tobacco consumption is correlated with
the contemporaneous error, the usual ﬁxed eﬀects estimator does not lead to consistent
estimation of τ. Unfortunately, there are various reasons why such a correlation might
6arise. To ﬁx ideas, consider an individual that receives an promotion accompanied by a
raise in wages or the opposite case where an individual is forced to switch to a worse paid
job to avoid unemployment. Both of these cases can be expected to be accompanied by a
certain level of stress that may in turn inﬂuence tobacco consumption. As we cannot fully
control for such events, our smoking measure is most likely endogenous, even conditional
on the unobserved individual ﬁxed eﬀect.
As a simple solution to this problem, we use an alternative model where we instru-
ment current tobacco consumption with one year lags. In this model, we ﬁrst purge the
unobserved ﬁxed eﬀect by ﬁrst diﬀerences and then use two-step GMM with the aforemen-
tioned lags as instruments.2 Tests for the validity of the instruments conﬁrmed the absence
of weak instruments problems with the lowest observed value for the Kleibergen-Paap rk
Wald F statistic being 43.397 and the typical value being larger than 100. For males, we
were also able to calculate an overidentiﬁed model using ﬁrst and second lags of tobacco
consumption, which indicated no problems with the exogeneity of the instruments as the
tests could never reject the null of instrument exogeneity with p-values usually around at
least 0.8. Unfortunately, this model could not be calculated for females as the number of
cases became to low.
To test the various hypotheses on the relationship between tobacco consumption and
wages, we estimate various versions of equation (1) separately for men and women. First,
a simple comparison of the OLS estimates using the pooled cross-sectional data with the
panel and IV-estimates provides guidance on the importance of unobserved factors in
explaining the smoking wage penalty. Second, we estimate equation (1) with and without
controlling for (self-assessed) health. Note that controlling for health and unobservables
implies that the wage eﬀects of smoking are completely related to either productivity
diﬀerences not related to health, e.g. a lower average working time of smokers due to
smoking breaks, or to discrimination. A comparison of the estimates for τ in these models
with the estimate for τ in the models without controls for health, allows us to assess the
relative importance of health related diﬀerences between smokers and non-smokers in the
determination of the smoking wage penalty.
In a second step of the econometric analysis, we use the fact that we observe the pattern
2Estimation and testing was used the xtivreg2-Stata-ado-ﬁle by Schaﬀer (2007).
7of smoking behavior over a long period of time to distinguish between permanent smok-
ers (always-smokers), permanent non-smokers (never-smokers) and individuals starting or
stopping to smoke (starters and stoppers). More speciﬁcally, we open a rolling time-frame
of ﬁve years {t − 2,t − 1,t,t + 1,t + 2} in a year t and use smoking behavior observed
during this period to form the groups mentioned above. An always-smoker is deﬁned as
an individual that is observed smoking during the complete interval. Similarly, a never-
smoker is an individual that did not smoke in any year from t − 2 to t + 2. Starters are
individuals who did not smoke from t − 2 to t, but smoked in t + 1 and t + 2, while the
group of stoppers is formed by those who smoked from t − 2 to t and did not smoke in
t + 1 and t + 2. Starting in 1993 and increasing t in one year steps until 2003, we obtain
11 cohorts used in the subsequent analysis. Pooling the data from these cohorts as case
numbers become rather low due to the necessity of a balanced ﬁve year panel, we obtain
a total of 2,782 never-smokers (1,684 men), 955 always-smokers (555 men), 89 starters (66
men) and 182 stoppers (121 men).
To obtain an estimate for the eﬀect of starting or stopping to smoke, we match each
member of the treatment group (either starters or stoppers) with a member of the control
group (either always-smokers or never-smokers) using Mahanalobis-matching on the esti-
mated propensity score to start/stop smoking and the respective cohort.3 Matching is done
on the whole sample, where gender is also included in the calculation of the Mahanalobis-
distance and separately for men and women.
The propensity score is estimated using a Probit-regression with characteristics in t as
right hand side variables and being a either a starter or stopper relative to being either
a never-smoker or an always smoker as the dependent variable. Explanatory variables
are the monthly wage in t, a third-order polynomial in age, the number of children and
dummy-variables for marital status, education, the number of employees at the workplace,
union-membership, employer-type (private company, local or central government), region of
residence, socio-economic class of the current job (including some control for industry) and
dummies for being of Indian, Pakistani or Bangladeshi heritage and for being non-white.
Note that the wage in t can be expected to pick up most of the unobservable productivity
diﬀerences that existed between the diﬀerent groups in t. Additionally, matching on the
3Matching was performed using the psmatch2-Stata-ado-ﬁle (Version 3.0.0) by Leuven and Sianesi
(2003).
8cohort ensures that persons from the same cohort are matched to each other.
To obtain the wage impact of the decision to start or stop smoking, we then compare
wages at t+2 within the matched pairs of individuals from the respective treatment/control
group combination. The general setup of this estimation procedure is displayed in table 1.
Note that this procedure is borrowed from the literature on the causal eﬀect of exporting
on productivity (see Wagner 2002 for the pioneering paper and Wagner 2007 for a survey
on the literature).
(Table 1 about here.)
4 Descriptive results
Before turning to the econometric results, consider shortly the descriptive comparisons
between smokers and non-smokers displayed in table 2. Note ﬁrst that both male and
female smokers earn between 100£ and 170£ (in 1987 prices) less than their non-smoking
counterparts. Smokers also tend to work slightly longer hours, are younger and less likely
to be married than non-smokers.
(Table 2 about here.)
Large diﬀerences can be seen when looking at education: Both male and female non-
smokers are much more likely to have received an academic qualiﬁcation, while a higher
share of smokers is low qualiﬁed or did not obtain further qualiﬁcations. Note that these
diﬀerences may point toward the importance of diﬀerences in time preferences as discussed
in the introduction.
Other diﬀerences can be found when considering self-assessed health-status. Smokers
are less likely then non-smokers to report excellent health and are more likely to be of
fair health. Again, diﬀerences in health are one of the explanations typically used for the
smoking wage penalty.
Finally, consider diﬀerences in employer characteristics: Here we ﬁnd no large diﬀer-
ences between smokers and non-smokers when it comes to ﬁrm size. However, smokers are




Consider now the estimation results for the parameters of interest displayed in table 3.
Full estimation results can be found in the tables 7 to 10 in the appendix. Focus ﬁrst on
the results using a dummy variable for smoker-status. Here we obtain a 2% to 3% earnings
penalty in all cross-section regressions. This penalty becomes smaller and even positive for
women when using ﬁxed eﬀects estimators. Using instrumental variables, the results are
similar to the ﬁxed eﬀects estimates for men and about half the size of the OLS-estimates
for women. However, neither the ﬁxed eﬀects estimates, nor the instrumental variables
results are signiﬁcant on any conventional level.
(Table 3 about here.)
Now consider the results for the smoking intensity. Here, we obtain a U-shaped rela-
tionship between tobacco consumption and wages for all OLS-estimations and, in case of
men, also for the ﬁxed eﬀect estimates. Note that there are plenty observations on both
sides of the minimum of the resulting parabola, indicating that the relationship should
indeed be interpreted as U-shaped rather than degressively falling. Note further, that
while the point estimates look minuscule at ﬁrst sight, they give the eﬀect of smoking one
additional cigarette per day. Looking at the average consumption observed in our sample,
which is 15.88 cigarettes per day for man and 13.76 cigarettes for women, we ﬁnd wage
penalties between 2% and 4% using the OLS estimates. For the (signiﬁcant) ﬁxed eﬀects
estimates for men, however, the average consumption leads to a wage penalty of only 0.2%
which is clearly ignorable from an economic point of view. Both the ﬁxed eﬀects estimates
for women as well as all instrumental variable estimates are insigniﬁcant.
Note that there are generally relatively small diﬀerences between the ﬁxed eﬀects and
instrumental variable estimates which suggests that it is more important to control for
time-constant unobserved heterogeneity than for contemporaneous endogeneity. There
are, however, some hints that contemporaneous endogeneity matters for women as there
are sign changes in the point estimates when using instrumental variables. Note though,
10that these may be statistical artifacts as none of the estimates is statistically signiﬁcant
on any conventional level.
What do the results suggest for the diﬀerent theories on the causes of the smoking
wage penalty? First, note that the parameter estimates for the eﬀect of smoking on wages
do not change much when including controls for health status. This result suggests that
health diﬀerences between smokers and non-smokers are – at least in the sample at hand –
not responsible for the smoking wage penalty. There are two possible explanations for this
result that is similar to the ﬁndings by Levine, Gustafson and Velenchick (1997). The ﬁrst,
that has also been used by Levine, Gustafson and Velenchick (1997), would be that health is
more important for the question whether an individual is able to ﬁnd employment than for
the determination of wages conditional on being employed. A second possible explanation
would be that many of the more severe adverse health eﬀects of smoking show up later
in life and do not matter (yet) for the age groups (20 to 55 years) considered in this
investigation.
Now, consider the ﬁxed eﬀect and instrumental variable estimates for the wage eﬀects
of smoking. As health eﬀects do not seem to play an important role and as unobserved
factors have been purged from the estimation, the remaining eﬀects can be related to
either discrimination or productivity eﬀects not related to health, e.g. a higher number
of (smoking) breaks. As all estimates are either insigniﬁcant or economically negligible, it
seems safe to conclude that neither discrimination, nor productivity diﬀerences between
smokers and non-smokers play a dominant role in explaining the smoking wage penalty.
One should note at this point though that the point estimates suggest a 1% wage penalty
for smoking men related to these explanation which is about one third of the penalty found
in cross-section regressions.
Finally, looking at the OLS-estimates, we ﬁnd them to be about two to eight times larger
than the ﬁxed eﬀect and instrumental variable estimates, a ﬁnding that points toward the
importance of unobserved factors in the determination of the smoking wage penalty. This
ﬁnding is also similar to the results found by Heineck and Schwarze (2003) for Germany.
115.2 Matching results
Consider now the matching estimates displayed in table 4. Remember that these are
the wage eﬀects in t + 2 associated with stopping or starting smoking in t relative to
remaining smoker or non-smoker. The fact that the number of matched units in the
separate estimations do not add up to the number of matched units in the estimation with
the whole sample is caused by imposing a common support restriction and is harmless for
the results. Starting with results for starters displayed in the top two panels of table 4, one
notices that all eﬀects are rather small and consequently insigniﬁcant on all conventional
levels. Note that given this insigniﬁcance and the small samples for the separate estimations
by gender, the sign change between the diﬀerent estimates is not unusual.
(Table 4 about here.)
Considering the somewhat larger group of stoppers, we ﬁnd only minimal eﬀects asso-
ciated with the decision to stop smoking. Again, all estimates are also insigniﬁcant on any
conventional level. These ﬁndings, displaying a consistent lack of support for the existence
of any causal eﬀect of smoking on wages, provide further support for our earlier ﬁnding
that the observed smoking wage penalty in the cross section is mainly caused by diﬀerences
in unobservable factors.
6 Conclusion
This paper used annual panel data on tobacco consumption and wages from the British
Household Panel Survey to investigate the eﬀect of smoking on wages in the UK. Using
linear regression, ﬁxed eﬀects panel estimators and panel instrumental variables, several
hypotheses typically used to explain the smoking wage penalty were tested. More specif-
ically, the importance of diﬀerences in health, diﬀerences in unobservable factors as well
as discrimination and productivity diﬀerences unrelated to health was tested. Addition-
ally, we used Mahalanobis-matching to compare individuals starting or stopping to smoke
with individuals who remained either smokers or non-smokers throughout the observation
period.
12Our results show strong support for the importance of unobservable factors, including
time preference rates and other preferences, for the determination of the smoking wage
penalty. Discrimination, diﬀerences in health and diﬀerences in productivity, however,
seem to be of relatively minor importance. Similarly there are no large returns or penalties
associated with the decision to begin or stop smoking relative to remaining smoker or non-
smoker. On a methodological level our results suggest that it is more important to correct
for unobserved heterogeneity than for contemporaneous endogeneity when evaluating the
eﬀects of tobacco consumption.
7 References
1. Anger, Silke and Michael Kvasnicka, 2006: “Biases in estimates of the smoking wage
penalty”, DIW-Berlin Discussion Paper 654.
2. Arrow, Kenneth, 1973: "The theory of discrimination", in Orley C. Ashenfelter and
Albert Rees, eds.: "Discrimination in labor markets", Princeton University Press,
Princeton, NJ, pp. 3-33.
3. Auld, M. Christopher, 2005: “Smoking, drinking, and income”, The Journal of Hu-
man Resources 40(2), pp. 505-518.
4. Becker, Gary S., 1957/1971: "The economics of discrimination", 2nd edition (1971),
University of Chicago Press, Chicago.
5. Becker, Gary S., and Kevin M. Murphy, 1988: “A theory of rational addiction”,
Journal of Political Economy 96(4), pp. 675-701.
6. Becker, Gary S., Michael Grossman, and Kevin M. Murphy, 1994: “An empirical
analysis of cigarette addiction”, American Economic Review 84(3), pp. 396-418.
7. Bertera, Robert L., 1991: “The eﬀects of behavioral risks on absenteeism and health-
care costs in the workplace”, Journal of Occupational Medicine 33(11), pp. 1119-1123.
8. Bush, Robert and Mark Wooden, 1995: “Smoking and absence from work: Aus-
tralian evidence”, Social Sciences and Medicine 41 (3), pp. 437-446.
9. Heineck, Guido and Johannes Schwarze, 2003: “Substance Use and Earnings: The
Case of Smokers in Germany”, IZA Discussion Paper 743.
10. Kristein, Marvin M., 1983: “How much can business expect to proﬁt from smoking
cessation?”, Preventive Medicine 12(2), pp. 358-381.
11. Lee, Yew Liang, 1999: “Wage eﬀects of drinking and smoking: An analysis using
Australian twins data”, University of Western Australia Working Paper 99-22.
1312. Leigh, J. Paul and Mark C. Berger, 1989: “Eﬀects of smoking and being overweight
on current earnings”, American Journal of Preventive Medicine 5(1), pp. 8-14.
13. Leuven, Edwin and Barbara Sianesi, 2003: “PSMATCH2: Stata module to perform
full Mahalanobis and propensity score matching, common support graphing, and co-
variate imbalance testing”.
http://ideas.repec.org/c/boc/bocode/s432001.html.
14. Lye, Jenny N. and Joe Hirschberg, 2004: “Alcohol consumption, smoking and wages”,
Applied Economics 36(16), pp. 1807-1817.
15. van Ours, Jan C., 2004, “A pint a day raises a man’s pay; but smoking blows that
gain away”, Journal of Health Economics 23(5), pp. 863-886.
16. van Ours, Jan C., 2006, “Cannabis, cocaine and jobs”, Journal of Applied Econo-
metrics 21(7), pp. 897-917.
17. van Ours, Jan C., 2007, “The eﬀects of cannabis use on the wages of prime-age
males”, Oxford Bulletin of Economics and Statistics 69(5), pp. 619-634.
18. Phelps, Edmund S., 1972: "The statistical theory of racism and sexism", American
Economic Review 62: 659-661.
19. Ryan, James, Craig Zwerling and Endel John Orav, 1992: “Occupational risks as-
sociated with cigarette smoking: a prospective study”, American Journal of Public
Health 82(1), pp. 29-32.
20. Schaﬀer, Mark E., 2007: “xtivreg2: Stata module to perform extended IV/2SLS,
GMM and AC/HAC, LIML and k-class regression for panel data models”.
http://ideas.repec.org/c/boc/bocode/s456501.html
21. Wagner, Joachim, 2002: “The causal eﬀects of exports on ﬁrm size and labor pro-
ductivity: ﬁrst evidence from a matching approach”, Economics Letters 77(2), pp.
287-292.
22. Wagner, Joachim, 2007: “Exports and productivity: A survey on the evidence from
ﬁrm level data”, The World Economy 30(1), pp. 60-82.
148 Tables
Table 1: Definition of groups
t − 2 t − 1 t t + 1 t + 2 Group
smoker smoker smoker smoker smoker always-smoker
non-smoker non-smoker non-smoker non-smoker non-smoker never-smoker
non-smoker non-smoker non-smoker smoker smoker starter



































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































17Table 4: Impact of smoking on wages t+2, average treatment effects on
the treated (ATT), Mahanalobis-matching
Starters vs. never-smokers
Whole sample Men Women
ATT -63.94 43.64 43.56
(71.16) (73.90) (118.67)
No. of matched starters 89 66 18
Starters vs. always-smokers
Whole sample Men Women
ATT -18.71 -78.68 -73.97
(81.26) (100.39) (142.30)
No. of matched starters 85 64 16
Stoppers vs. never-smokers
Whole sample Men Women
ATT -1.14 -10.86 -10.42
(49.75) (66.52) (67.51)
No. of matched stoppers 181 119 61
Starters vs. always-smokers
Whole sample Men Women
ATT -68.99 84.57 16.50
(65.84) (75.91) (88.62)
No. of matched stoppers 180 114 60
Average treatment eﬀect on the treated, standard errors in parentheses. ***/**/*/+ denote signiﬁcance
on the 0.1%, 1%, 5% and 10% level respectively. Matching variables to estimate the propensity score, all
taken from year t, were monthly wage, a third-order polynomial in age, the number of children and dummy-
variables for marital status, education, the number of employees at the workplace, union-membership,
employer-type (private company, local or central government), region of residence, socio-economic class of
the current job (including some control for industry) Indian, Pakistani or Bangladeshi heritage and for
being non-white. Mahanalobis matching was performed on the propensity score, the respective cohort and
for the estimations on the whole sample on gender. Case numbers reported are those on common support
only.
189 Appendix
Table 5: Descriptive statistics, male estimation sample
Variable Mean Std.dev. Min. Max.
overall within
Real monthly labor income (1987 prices) 1028.64 476.3781 212.6472 337.41 3227.32
Log real monthly labor income 6.84 0.4300 0.1922 5.82 8.08
Typical weekly working hours 39.68 4.7782 2.9414 30.00 60.00
Individual smokes (1 = yes) 0.29 0.4552 0.1859 0.00 1.00
Number of cigarettes typically smoked per day 4.62 8.5657 3.2519 0.00 70.00
Age (years) 36.80 9.5930 2.9310 20.00 55.00
Non-white (1 = yes) 0.01 0.1007 0.0000 0.00 1.00
Indian, Pakistani, Bangladeshi (1 = yes) 0.01 0.1067 0.0000 0.00 1.00
Married (1 = yes) 0.59 0.4918 0.2113 0.00 1.00
Lives with partner (1 = yes) 0.16 0.3643 0.2124 0.00 1.00
Widowed (1 = yes) 0.00 0.0513 0.0302 0.00 1.00
Divorced (1 = yes) 0.03 0.1809 0.1022 0.00 1.00
Separated (1 = yes) 0.01 0.1162 0.0886 0.00 1.00
Single (1 = yes) 0.20 0.4015 0.1676 0.00 1.00
Number of children in household 0.73 1.0086 0.4888 0.00 6.00
University degree (1 = yes) 0.18 0.3843 0.0642 0.00 1.00
Higher qualiﬁcation, teacher qual., nursing qual. (1 = yes) 0.31 0.4643 0.1790 0.00 1.00
A-levels (1 = yes) 0.15 0.3528 0.1247 0.00 1.00
O-levels (1 = yes) 0.19 0.3888 0.1192 0.00 1.00
Commercial qualiﬁcation, apprencticeship,etc. (1 = yes) 0.07 0.2509 0.0695 0.00 1.00
No qualiﬁcation (1 = yes) 0.11 0.3087 0.0691 0.00 1.00
Excellent health (1 = yes) 0.31 0.4606 0.3217 0.00 1.00
Good health (1 = yes) 0.51 0.4999 0.3929 0.00 1.00
Fair health (1 = yes) 0.15 0.3582 0.2795 0.00 1.00
Poor health (1 = yes) 0.03 0.1831 0.1436 0.00 1.00
Union member (1 = yes) 0.29 0.4532 0.2572 0.00 1.00
Workplace has 1 - 2 employees (1 = yes) 0.02 0.1543 0.1079 0.00 1.00
Workplace has 3 - 9 employees (1 = yes) 0.12 0.3253 0.2255 0.00 1.00
Workplace has 10 - 24 employees (1 = yes) 0.14 0.3428 0.2394 0.00 1.00
Workplace has 25 - 49 employees (1 = yes) 0.13 0.3341 0.2476 0.00 1.00
Workplace has 50 - 99 employees (1 = yes) 0.13 0.3337 0.2441 0.00 1.00
Workplace has 100 - 199 employees (1 = yes) 0.12 0.3234 0.2411 0.00 1.00
Workplace has 200 - 499 employees (1 = yes) 0.15 0.3586 0.2532 0.00 1.00
Workplace has 500 - 999 employees (1 = yes) 0.08 0.2745 0.1985 0.00 1.00
Workplace has 1000 or more employees (1 = yes) 0.11 0.3145 0.1935 0.00 1.00
Employer is private ﬁrm/company (1 = yes) 0.77 0.4199 0.1569 0.00 1.00
Employer is civil service/central government (1 = yes) 0.05 0.2233 0.1098 0.00 1.00
Employer is local government/town hall (1 = yes) 0.09 0.2911 0.1214 0.00 1.00
Other employer (1 = yes) 0.08 0.2751 0.1465 0.00 1.00
No. of Observations 33,313
No. of Individuals 6,647
19Table 6: Descriptive statistics, female estimation sample
Variable Mean Std.dev. Min. Max.
overall within
Real monthly labor income (1987 prices) 779.20 349.7612 138.9596 246.69 2141.89
Log real monthly labor income 6.57 0.4261 0.1712 5.51 7.67
Typical weekly working hours 37.07 3.8251 2.3508 30.00 60.00
Individual smokes (1 = yes) 0.30 0.4566 0.1709 0.00 1.00
Number of cigarettes typically smoked per day 4.04 7.4384 2.5884 0.00 60.00
Age (years) 36.11 9.9942 2.6547 20.00 55.00
Non-white (1 = yes) 0.02 0.1365 0.0000 0.00 1.00
Indian, Pakistani, Bangladeshi (1 = yes) 0.01 0.0947 0.0000 0.00 1.00
Married (1 = yes) 0.49 0.4999 0.2168 0.00 1.00
Lives with partner (1 = yes) 0.18 0.3877 0.2236 0.00 1.00
Widowed (1 = yes) 0.01 0.1067 0.0517 0.00 1.00
Divorced (1 = yes) 0.07 0.2585 0.1262 0.00 1.00
Separated (1 = yes) 0.02 0.1560 0.1055 0.00 1.00
Single (1 = yes) 0.22 0.4137 0.1728 0.00 1.00
Number of children in household 0.43 0.7784 0.3530 0.00 6.00
University degree (1 = yes) 0.20 0.4014 0.0751 0.00 1.00
Higher qualiﬁcation, teacher qual., nursing qual. (1 = yes) 0.30 0.4562 0.1694 0.00 1.00
A-levels (1 = yes) 0.14 0.3441 0.1162 0.00 1.00
O-levels (1 = yes) 0.22 0.4136 0.1224 0.00 1.00
Commercial qualiﬁcation, apprencticeship,etc. (1 = yes) 0.06 0.2442 0.0621 0.00 1.00
No qualiﬁcation (1 = yes) 0.08 0.2756 0.0646 0.00 1.00
Excellent health (1 = yes) 0.28 0.4470 0.3108 0.00 1.00
Good health (1 = yes) 0.52 0.4998 0.3872 0.00 1.00
Fair health (1 = yes) 0.16 0.3658 0.2831 0.00 1.00
Poor health (1 = yes) 0.05 0.2155 0.1686 0.00 1.00
Union member (1 = yes) 0.34 0.4731 0.2547 0.00 1.00
Workplace has 1 - 2 employees (1 = yes) 0.02 0.1359 0.0888 0.00 1.00
Workplace has 3 - 9 employees (1 = yes) 0.12 0.3278 0.2136 0.00 1.00
Workplace has 10 - 24 employees (1 = yes) 0.16 0.3704 0.2422 0.00 1.00
Workplace has 25 - 49 employees (1 = yes) 0.15 0.3533 0.2410 0.00 1.00
Workplace has 50 - 99 employees (1 = yes) 0.13 0.3332 0.2311 0.00 1.00
Workplace has 100 - 199 employees (1 = yes) 0.11 0.3132 0.2232 0.00 1.00
Workplace has 200 - 499 employees (1 = yes) 0.12 0.3259 0.2294 0.00 1.00
Workplace has 500 - 999 employees (1 = yes) 0.07 0.2490 0.1790 0.00 1.00
Workplace has 1000 or more employees (1 = yes) 0.12 0.3294 0.1926 0.00 1.00
Employer is private ﬁrm/company (1 = yes) 0.57 0.4948 0.1792 0.00 1.00
Employer is civil service/central government (1 = yes) 0.06 0.2306 0.1026 0.00 1.00
Employer is local government/town hall (1 = yes) 0.19 0.3903 0.1515 0.00 1.00
Other employer (1 = yes) 0.18 0.3879 0.1754 0.00 1.00
No. of Observations 23,546
No. of Individuals 5,611
20Table 7: Wage regressions, male sample, without health controls, depen-
dent variable: log monthly real wages
Variable OLS Fixed-Eﬀects Panel-IV OLS Fixed-Eﬀects Panel-IV
Individual smokes (1 = yes) -0.0307*** -0.0091 0.0024 – – –
(0.0077) (0.0074) (0.0161) – – –
Number of cigarettes typically smoked per day – – – -0.0033*** -0.0017+ -0.0003
– – – (0.0009) (0.0009) (0.0025)
Number of cigarettes typically smoked per day – – – 0.0001* 0.0001** 0.0001
(squared) – – – (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0001)
Age (years) 0.1097*** 0.1938*** 0.1397*** 0.1095*** 0.1943*** 0.1405***
(0.0140) (0.0144) (0.0268) (0.0141) (0.0144) (0.0272)
Age (squared) -0.0022*** -0.0037*** -0.0032*** -0.0022*** -0.0037*** -0.0032***
(0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0007) (0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0007)
Age (cubic) 0.0000*** 0.0000*** 0.0000*** 0.0000*** 0.0000*** 0.0000***
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)
Married (1 = yes) 0.1258*** 0.0305* 0.0055 0.1258*** 0.0298* 0.0044
(0.0117) (0.0130) (0.0125) (0.0117) (0.0130) (0.0126)
Lives with partner (1 = yes) 0.0723*** 0.0186+ -0.0062 0.0730*** 0.0175+ -0.0071
(0.0105) (0.0104) (0.0096) (0.0105) (0.0105) (0.0097)
Widowed (1 = yes) 0.0642 0.0052 -0.0073 0.0653 0.0034 -0.0102
(0.0530) (0.0755) (0.0530) (0.0530) (0.0752) (0.0530)
Divorced (1 = yes) 0.0508* -0.0019 0.0014 0.0507* -0.0049 -0.0025
(0.0217) (0.0194) (0.0181) (0.0218) (0.0194) (0.0181)
Separated (1 = yes) 0.1052*** 0.0127 -0.0093 0.1055*** 0.0099 -0.0129
(0.0239) (0.0193) (0.0171) (0.0237) (0.0193) (0.0173)
Number of children in household 0.0133** 0.0075+ 0.0102* 0.0135** 0.0074+ 0.0101*
(0.0042) (0.0041) (0.0043) (0.0042) (0.0041) (0.0043)
Indian, Pakistani, Bangladeshi (1 = yes) -0.1585*** – – -0.1607*** – –
(0.0397) – – (0.0397) – –
Non-white (1 = yes) -0.0826* – – -0.0821* – –
(0.0344) – – (0.0342) – –
University degree (1 = yes) 0.1993*** 0.0763* 0.0418 0.1980*** 0.0758* 0.0417
(0.0141) (0.0313) (0.0346) (0.0141) (0.0313) (0.0348)
Higher qualiﬁcation, teacher qual., nursing qual. (1 = yes) 0.0681*** -0.0452** 0.0062 0.0674*** -0.0458** 0.0057
(0.0108) (0.0148) (0.0173) (0.0108) (0.0147) (0.0172)
A-levels (1 = yes) 0.0252* -0.0370+ -0.0333 0.0252* -0.0372* -0.0346
(0.0128) (0.0189) (0.0232) (0.0128) (0.0188) (0.0232)
Commercial qualiﬁcation, apprenticeship,etc. (1 = yes) -0.0183 -0.0467 -0.0466 -0.0178 -0.0476+ -0.0485
(0.0168) (0.0290) (0.0321) (0.0167) (0.0289) (0.0324)
No qualiﬁcation (1 = yes) -0.1271*** -0.0309 -0.0336 -0.1262*** -0.0312 -0.0345
(0.0139) (0.0258) (0.0358) (0.0139) (0.0257) (0.0354)
Union member (1 = yes) 0.0656*** 0.0164** 0.0159* 0.0657*** 0.0170** 0.0170**
(0.0078) (0.0059) (0.0063) (0.0078) (0.0059) (0.0063)
Employer is civil service/central government (1 = yes) -0.0501** -0.0214 0.0075 -0.0504** -0.0221 0.0072
(0.0167) (0.0170) (0.0149) (0.0167) (0.0170) (0.0150)
Employer is local government/town hall (1 = yes) -0.0201+ 0.0013 0.0091 -0.0203+ 0.0017 0.0095
(0.0122) (0.0182) (0.0158) (0.0123) (0.0183) (0.0160)
Other employer (1 = yes) -0.0890*** -0.0156 0.0083 -0.0889*** -0.0146 0.0084
(0.0136) (0.0125) (0.0109) (0.0136) (0.0125) (0.0111)
Workplace has 1 - 2 employees (1 = yes) -0.1565*** -0.0768*** 0.0030 -0.1563*** -0.0781*** 0.0031
(0.0227) (0.0163) (0.0139) (0.0228) (0.0162) (0.0139)
Workplace has 3 - 9 employees (1 = yes) -0.1049*** -0.0527*** -0.0136+ -0.1049*** -0.0532*** -0.0133+
(0.0109) (0.0083) (0.0075) (0.0109) (0.0083) (0.0076)
Workplace has 10 - 24 employees (1 = yes) -0.0389*** -0.0227** 0.0016 -0.0393*** -0.0225** 0.0014
(0.0109) (0.0080) (0.0068) (0.0109) (0.0080) (0.0069)
Workplace has 25 - 49 employees (1 = yes) -0.0225* -0.0205** -0.0069 -0.0229* -0.0207** -0.0076
(0.0100) (0.0066) (0.0059) (0.0100) (0.0066) (0.0059)
Workplace has 100 - 199 employees (1 = yes) 0.0153 0.0074 0.0099+ 0.0151 0.0067 0.0096+
(0.0098) (0.0066) (0.0057) (0.0098) (0.0066) (0.0057)
Workplace has 200 - 499 employees (1 = yes) 0.0307** 0.0073 -0.0027 0.0306** 0.0070 -0.0022
(0.0107) (0.0075) (0.0064) (0.0107) (0.0075) (0.0064)
Workplace has 500 - 999 employees (1 = yes) 0.0630*** 0.0147 0.0015 0.0626*** 0.0139 0.0017
(0.0129) (0.0094) (0.0076) (0.0129) (0.0095) (0.0077)
Workplace has 1000 or more employees (1 = yes) 0.0775*** 0.0217* 0.0018 0.0772*** 0.0212* 0.0022
(0.0125) (0.0093) (0.0080) (0.0125) (0.0093) (0.0080)
Constant 4.6483*** 3.4559*** 0.0303*** 4.8147*** 3.4455*** 0.0303***
(0.1735) (0.1832) (0.0051) (0.1943) (0.1835) (0.0051)
Occupation class dummies (included) (included) (included) (included) (included) (included)
Regional dummies (included) (included) (included) (included) (included) (included)
No. of Obs. 32,356 32,356 17,216 32,243 32,243 17,069
R2 0.4615 0.2605 0.0231 0.4621 0.2617 0.0236
Sig.(Model) 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Coeﬃcients, cluster-robust standard errors in parentheses. ***/**/*/+ denote signiﬁcance on the
0.1%, 1%, 5% and 10% level respectively.
21Table 8: Wage regressions, female sample, without health controls, de-
pendent variable: log monthly real wages
Variable OLS Fixed-Eﬀects Panel-IV OLS Fixed-Eﬀects Panel-IV
Individual smokes (1 = yes) -0.0247** 0.0030 -0.0165 – – –
(0.0084) (0.0083) (0.0229) – – –
Number of cigarettes typically smoked per day – – – -0.0037** 0.0006 -0.0017
– – – (0.0013) (0.0012) (0.0034)
Number of cigarettes typically smoked per day – – – 0.0001* 0.0000 -0.0000
(squared) – – – (0.0001) (0.0000) (0.0001)
Age (years) 0.1807*** 0.2137*** 0.0849** 0.1807*** 0.2141*** 0.0885***
(0.0150) (0.0154) (0.0268) (0.0150) (0.0155) (0.0268)
Age (squared) -0.0042*** -0.0043*** -0.0018* -0.0042*** -0.0043*** -0.0019**
(0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0007) (0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0007)
Age (cubic) 0.0000*** 0.0000*** 0.0000 0.0000*** 0.0000*** 0.0000+
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)
Married (1 = yes) -0.0080 0.0019 -0.0040 -0.0079 0.0018 -0.0056
(0.0114) (0.0120) (0.0112) (0.0114) (0.0121) (0.0113)
Lives with partner (1 = yes) 0.0175+ 0.0067 0.0038 0.0179+ 0.0068 0.0039
(0.0104) (0.0099) (0.0094) (0.0104) (0.0100) (0.0094)
Widowed (1 = yes) -0.0432 0.0163 0.0133 -0.0409 0.0160 0.0116
(0.0344) (0.0302) (0.0254) (0.0345) (0.0304) (0.0257)
Divorced (1 = yes) -0.0002 -0.0070 0.0193 -0.0001 -0.0077 0.0145
(0.0174) (0.0178) (0.0165) (0.0174) (0.0178) (0.0164)
Separated (1 = yes) -0.0103 -0.0005 0.0111 -0.0110 -0.0037 0.0010
(0.0216) (0.0167) (0.0158) (0.0216) (0.0163) (0.0146)
Number of children in household -0.0324*** -0.0465*** -0.0123+ -0.0322*** -0.0461*** -0.0128+
(0.0054) (0.0060) (0.0071) (0.0054) (0.0060) (0.0071)
Indian, Pakistani, Bangladeshi (1 = yes) -0.1168* – – -0.1179* – –
(0.0481) – – (0.0481) – –
Non-white (1 = yes) -0.0523+ – – -0.0527+ – –
(0.0285) – – (0.0287) – –
University degree (1 = yes) 0.2362*** 0.0744* 0.0542* 0.2360*** 0.0734* 0.0528+
(0.0150) (0.0294) (0.0275) (0.0151) (0.0294) (0.0274)
Higher qualiﬁcation, teacher qual., nursing qual. (1 = yes) 0.0898*** 0.0271+ 0.0094 0.0898*** 0.0260+ 0.0078
(0.0117) (0.0150) (0.0175) (0.0117) (0.0151) (0.0175)
A-levels (1 = yes) 0.0365** -0.0160 -0.0119 0.0363** -0.0171 -0.0152
(0.0129) (0.0184) (0.0180) (0.0129) (0.0185) (0.0180)
Commercial qualiﬁcation, apprenticeship,etc. (1 = yes) -0.0414* 0.0490 0.0017 -0.0405* 0.0482 0.0001
(0.0165) (0.0317) (0.0331) (0.0165) (0.0317) (0.0331)
No qualiﬁcation (1 = yes) -0.1140*** -0.0328 -0.0634+ -0.1144*** -0.0330 -0.0690*
(0.0181) (0.0266) (0.0335) (0.0181) (0.0268) (0.0342)
Union member (1 = yes) 0.0829*** 0.0169** 0.0130* 0.0824*** 0.0172** 0.0137*
(0.0083) (0.0060) (0.0059) (0.0083) (0.0060) (0.0058)
Employer is civil service/central government (1 = yes) -0.0072 -0.0060 -0.0024 -0.0071 -0.0042 -0.0016
(0.0154) (0.0161) (0.0144) (0.0153) (0.0161) (0.0145)
Employer is local government/town hall (1 = yes) 0.0513*** 0.0412* -0.0049 0.0512*** 0.0425* -0.0044
(0.0133) (0.0169) (0.0135) (0.0134) (0.0170) (0.0136)
Other employer (1 = yes) -0.0138 0.0030 -0.0042 -0.0135 0.0043 -0.0029
(0.0113) (0.0115) (0.0089) (0.0113) (0.0115) (0.0090)
Workplace has 1 - 2 employees (1 = yes) -0.1773*** -0.1030*** -0.0276 -0.1792*** -0.1026*** -0.0355+
(0.0289) (0.0217) (0.0220) (0.0288) (0.0217) (0.0208)
Workplace has 3 - 9 employees (1 = yes) -0.1234*** -0.0494*** -0.0210* -0.1234*** -0.0484*** -0.0197*
(0.0124) (0.0096) (0.0082) (0.0124) (0.0096) (0.0083)
Workplace has 10 - 24 employees (1 = yes) -0.0549*** -0.0283** -0.0018 -0.0549*** -0.0277** -0.0010
(0.0121) (0.0086) (0.0079) (0.0121) (0.0086) (0.0079)
Workplace has 25 - 49 employees (1 = yes) -0.0476*** -0.0133+ 0.0035 -0.0470*** -0.0130+ 0.0040
(0.0112) (0.0071) (0.0062) (0.0113) (0.0071) (0.0062)
Workplace has 100 - 199 employees (1 = yes) 0.0083 0.0001 0.0048 0.0083 0.0001 0.0050
(0.0118) (0.0069) (0.0064) (0.0118) (0.0069) (0.0064)
Workplace has 200 - 499 employees (1 = yes) 0.0239* 0.0122 0.0093 0.0246* 0.0128 0.0102
(0.0119) (0.0082) (0.0072) (0.0120) (0.0082) (0.0073)
Workplace has 500 - 999 employees (1 = yes) 0.0284+ 0.0257** 0.0119 0.0284+ 0.0254* 0.0126
(0.0149) (0.0099) (0.0086) (0.0150) (0.0100) (0.0087)
Workplace has 1000 or more employees (1 = yes) 0.0275* 0.0210* 0.0123 0.0281* 0.0214* 0.0127
(0.0134) (0.0101) (0.0082) (0.0134) (0.0101) (0.0082)
Constant 4.0605*** 3.0978*** 0.0319*** 4.0488*** 3.1589*** 0.0325***
(0.2313) (0.2157) (0.0051) (0.2309) (0.2094) (0.0051)
Occupation class dummies (included) (included) (included) (included) (included) (included)
Regional dummies (included) (included) (included) (included) (included) (included)
No. of Obs. 22,733 22,733 10,673 22,640 22,640 10,562
R2 0.5283 0.3298 0.0295 0.5284 0.3301 0.0281
Sig.(Model) 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Coeﬃcients, cluster-robust standard errors in parentheses. ***/**/*/+ denote signiﬁcance on the
0.1%, 1%, 5% and 10% level respectively.
22Table 9: Wage regressions, male sample, with health controls, dependent
variable: log monthly real wages
Variable OLS Fixed-Eﬀects Panel-IV OLS Fixed-Eﬀects Panel-IV
Individual smokes (1 = yes) -0.0265*** -0.0093 0.0024 – – –
(0.0077) (0.0074) (0.0161) – – –
Number of cigarettes typically smoked per day – – – -0.0031*** -0.0017+ -0.0004
– – – (0.0009) (0.0009) (0.0025)
Number of cigarettes typically smoked per day – – – 0.0001* 0.0001** 0.0001
(squared) – – – (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0001)
Excellent health (1 = yes) 0.0253*** -0.0008 0.0056+ 0.0250*** -0.0010 0.0054+
(0.0062) (0.0036) (0.0032) (0.0062) (0.0036) (0.0032)
Fair health (1 = yes) -0.0288*** -0.0051 0.0027 -0.0288*** -0.0052 0.0025
(0.0067) (0.0042) (0.0037) (0.0067) (0.0042) (0.0037)
Poor health (1 = yes) -0.0735*** -0.0244** -0.0146+ -0.0730*** -0.0245** -0.0150*
(0.0124) (0.0076) (0.0076) (0.0124) (0.0076) (0.0076)
Age (years) 0.1105*** 0.1938*** 0.1402*** 0.1103*** 0.1943*** 0.1410***
(0.0140) (0.0144) (0.0268) (0.0140) (0.0144) (0.0272)
Age (squared) -0.0022*** -0.0037*** -0.0032*** -0.0022*** -0.0037*** -0.0032***
(0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0007) (0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0007)
Age (cubic) 0.0000*** 0.0000*** 0.0000*** 0.0000*** 0.0000*** 0.0000***
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)
Married (1 = yes) 0.1245*** 0.0303* 0.0052 0.1246*** 0.0297* 0.0042
(0.0117) (0.0130) (0.0125) (0.0117) (0.0130) (0.0126)
Lives with partner (1 = yes) 0.0722*** 0.0185+ -0.0063 0.0729*** 0.0174+ -0.0071
(0.0105) (0.0104) (0.0096) (0.0105) (0.0105) (0.0097)
Widowed (1 = yes) 0.0629 0.0057 -0.0070 0.0638 0.0039 -0.0099
(0.0528) (0.0755) (0.0530) (0.0527) (0.0753) (0.0530)
Divorced (1 = yes) 0.0516* -0.0016 0.0019 0.0515* -0.0046 -0.0021
(0.0215) (0.0194) (0.0181) (0.0216) (0.0194) (0.0181)
Separated (1 = yes) 0.1033*** 0.0126 -0.0093 0.1033*** 0.0099 -0.0129
(0.0237) (0.0193) (0.0171) (0.0236) (0.0193) (0.0173)
Number of children in household 0.0134** 0.0076+ 0.0101* 0.0136** 0.0074+ 0.0100*
(0.0041) (0.0041) (0.0043) (0.0041) (0.0041) (0.0043)
Indian, Pakistani, Bangladeshi (1 = yes) -0.1558*** – – -0.1575*** – –
(0.0400) – – (0.0400) – –
Non-white (1 = yes) -0.0809* – – -0.0803* – –
(0.0348) – – (0.0347) – –
educ==universitydegree 0.1966*** 0.0758* 0.0416 0.1954*** 0.0752* 0.0415
(0.0141) (0.0313) (0.0346) (0.0141) (0.0313) (0.0347)
Higher qualiﬁcation, teacher qual., nursing qual. (1 = yes) 0.0677*** -0.0450** 0.0060 0.0670*** -0.0457** 0.0055
(0.0107) (0.0147) (0.0173) (0.0107) (0.0147) (0.0172)
A-levels (1 = yes) 0.0248+ -0.0370* -0.0337 0.0248+ -0.0372* -0.0350
(0.0127) (0.0189) (0.0232) (0.0127) (0.0188) (0.0232)
Commercial qualiﬁcation, apprenticeship,etc. (1 = yes) -0.0181 -0.0467 -0.0466 -0.0177 -0.0476+ -0.0484
(0.0168) (0.0289) (0.0321) (0.0168) (0.0288) (0.0325)
No qualiﬁcation (1 = yes) -0.1250*** -0.0306 -0.0330 -0.1242*** -0.0308 -0.0339
(0.0138) (0.0257) (0.0357) (0.0138) (0.0256) (0.0354)
Union member (1 = yes) 0.0658*** 0.0166** 0.0158* 0.0659*** 0.0171** 0.0169**
(0.0078) (0.0059) (0.0063) (0.0078) (0.0059) (0.0063)
Employer is civil service/central government (1 = yes) -0.0487** -0.0216 0.0073 -0.0489** -0.0223 0.0070
(0.0165) (0.0170) (0.0149) (0.0165) (0.0170) (0.0150)
Employer is local government/town hall (1 = yes) -0.0198 0.0012 0.0095 -0.0199 0.0015 0.0099
(0.0122) (0.0182) (0.0158) (0.0122) (0.0183) (0.0160)
Other employer (1 = yes) -0.0882*** -0.0155 0.0080 -0.0881*** -0.0146 0.0081
(0.0135) (0.0125) (0.0109) (0.0135) (0.0125) (0.0111)
Workplace has 1 - 2 employees (1 = yes) -0.1570*** -0.0767*** 0.0032 -0.1569*** -0.0781*** 0.0033
(0.0228) (0.0163) (0.0139) (0.0229) (0.0162) (0.0139)
Workplace has 3 - 9 employees (1 = yes) -0.1045*** -0.0529*** -0.0138+ -0.1046*** -0.0534*** -0.0135+
(0.0109) (0.0083) (0.0075) (0.0109) (0.0083) (0.0076)
Workplace has 10 - 24 employees (1 = yes) -0.0390*** -0.0227** 0.0015 -0.0394*** -0.0225** 0.0013
(0.0108) (0.0080) (0.0068) (0.0108) (0.0080) (0.0069)
Workplace has 25 - 49 employees (1 = yes) -0.0219* -0.0205** -0.0070 -0.0223* -0.0207** -0.0076
(0.0099) (0.0066) (0.0059) (0.0100) (0.0066) (0.0059)
Workplace has 100 - 199 employees (1 = yes) 0.0149 0.0073 0.0099+ 0.0147 0.0067 0.0097+
(0.0098) (0.0066) (0.0057) (0.0098) (0.0066) (0.0057)
Workplace has 200 - 499 employees (1 = yes) 0.0310** 0.0072 -0.0026 0.0309** 0.0069 -0.0020
(0.0106) (0.0075) (0.0064) (0.0106) (0.0075) (0.0064)
Workplace has 500 - 999 employees (1 = yes) 0.0624*** 0.0144 0.0013 0.0620*** 0.0135 0.0015
(0.0128) (0.0094) (0.0076) (0.0128) (0.0095) (0.0077)
Workplace has 1000 or more employees (1 = yes) 0.0769*** 0.0218* 0.0022 0.0765*** 0.0213* 0.0025
(0.0125) (0.0093) (0.0080) (0.0125) (0.0093) (0.0080)
Constant 4.6359*** 3.4570*** 0.0303*** 4.7949*** 3.4468*** 0.0303***
(0.1733) (0.1830) (0.0051) (0.1939) (0.1834) (0.0051)
Occupation class dummies (included) (included) (included) (included) (included) (included)
Regional dummies (included) (included) (included) (included) (included) (included)
No. of Obs. 32,356 32,356 17,216 32,2430 32,2430 17,069
R2 0.4642 0.2609 0.0236 0.4648 0.2621 0.0241
Sig.(Model) 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Coeﬃcients, cluster-robust standard errors in parentheses. ***/**/*/+ denote signiﬁcance on the
0.1%, 1%, 5% and 10% level respectively.
23Table 10: Wage regressions, male sample, with health controls, dependent
variable: log monthly real wages
Variable OLS Fixed-Eﬀects Panel-IV OLS Fixed-Eﬀects Panel-IV
Individual smokes (1 = yes) -0.0230** 0.0031 -0.0173 – – –
(0.0084) (0.0083) (0.0230) – – –
Number of cigarettes typically smoked per day – – – -0.0036** 0.0006 -0.0018
– – – (0.0013) (0.0012) (0.0034)
Number of cigarettes typically smoked per day – – – 0.0001+ 0.0000 -0.0000
(squared) – – – (0.0001) (0.0000) (0.0001)
Excellent health (1 = yes) 0.0101 0.0024 0.0010 0.0099 0.0022 0.0005
(0.0064) (0.0038) (0.0034) (0.0064) (0.0038) (0.0034)
Fair health (1 = yes) -0.0255*** -0.0073+ -0.0053 -0.0255*** -0.0072+ -0.0047
(0.0071) (0.0044) (0.0039) (0.0071) (0.0044) (0.0038)
Poor health (1 = yes) -0.0075 -0.0054 -0.0082 -0.0073 -0.0050 -0.0077
(0.0114) (0.0077) (0.0064) (0.0114) (0.0077) (0.0065)
Age (years) 0.1799*** 0.2135*** 0.0845** 0.1800*** 0.2139*** 0.0883***
(0.0149) (0.0154) (0.0268) (0.0150) (0.0155) (0.0268)
Age (squared) -0.0042*** -0.0043*** -0.0018* -0.0042*** -0.0043*** -0.0019**
(0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0007) (0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0007)
Age (cubic) 0.0000*** 0.0000*** 0.0000 0.0000*** 0.0000*** 0.0000+
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)
Married (1 = yes) -0.0071 0.0019 -0.0042 -0.0070 0.0018 -0.0057
(0.0114) (0.0120) (0.0112) (0.0114) (0.0121) (0.0113)
Lives with partner (1 = yes) 0.0180+ 0.0067 0.0037 0.0183+ 0.0069 0.0038
(0.0104) (0.0099) (0.0094) (0.0104) (0.0099) (0.0095)
Widowed (1 = yes) -0.0417 0.0166 0.0129 -0.0394 0.0162 0.0113
(0.0343) (0.0302) (0.0254) (0.0344) (0.0303) (0.0256)
Divorced (1 = yes) 0.0002 -0.0075 0.0189 0.0002 -0.0081 0.0142
(0.0173) (0.0178) (0.0165) (0.0173) (0.0178) (0.0164)
Separated (1 = yes) -0.0086 -0.0004 0.0111 -0.0095 -0.0036 0.0010
(0.0217) (0.0167) (0.0157) (0.0217) (0.0163) (0.0145)
Number of children in household -0.0325*** -0.0465*** -0.0122+ -0.0323*** -0.0461*** -0.0127+
(0.0054) (0.0059) (0.0071) (0.0054) (0.0060) (0.0071)
Indian, Pakistani, Bangladeshi (1 = yes) -0.1125* – – -0.1135* – –
(0.0485) – – (0.0485) – –
Non-white (1 = yes) -0.0515+ – – -0.0518+ – –
(0.0283) – – (0.0285) – –
educ==universitydegree 0.2361*** 0.0740* 0.0532+ 0.2360*** 0.0730* 0.0520+
(0.0150) (0.0293) (0.0274) (0.0151) (0.0294) (0.0274)
Higher qualiﬁcation, teacher qual., nursing qual. (1 = yes) 0.0904*** 0.0271+ 0.0091 0.0904*** 0.0260+ 0.0075
(0.0117) (0.0150) (0.0175) (0.0117) (0.0151) (0.0176)
A-levels (1 = yes) 0.0367** -0.0161 -0.0120 0.0365** -0.0172 -0.0154
(0.0129) (0.0184) (0.0180) (0.0129) (0.0185) (0.0180)
Commercial qualiﬁcation, apprenticeship,etc. (1 = yes) -0.0404* 0.0492 0.0014 -0.0395* 0.0484 -0.0001
(0.0165) (0.0316) (0.0330) (0.0166) (0.0317) (0.0331)
No qualiﬁcation (1 = yes) -0.1130*** -0.0327 -0.0640+ -0.1134*** -0.0329 -0.0695*
(0.0181) (0.0265) (0.0334) (0.0181) (0.0268) (0.0341)
Union member (1 = yes) 0.0825*** 0.0168** 0.0129* 0.0820*** 0.0171** 0.0136*
(0.0083) (0.0060) (0.0059) (0.0083) (0.0060) (0.0058)
Employer is civil service/central government (1 = yes) -0.0061 -0.0059 -0.0024 -0.0060 -0.0040 -0.0016
(0.0154) (0.0161) (0.0144) (0.0153) (0.0161) (0.0146)
Employer is local government/town hall (1 = yes) 0.0513*** 0.0412* -0.0048 0.0512*** 0.0425* -0.0043
(0.0133) (0.0169) (0.0134) (0.0134) (0.0170) (0.0135)
Other employer (1 = yes) -0.0139 0.0030 -0.0043 -0.0137 0.0042 -0.0030
(0.0112) (0.0115) (0.0089) (0.0113) (0.0115) (0.0090)
Workplace has 1 - 2 employees (1 = yes) -0.1775*** -0.1032*** -0.0277 -0.1794*** -0.1027*** -0.0356+
(0.0289) (0.0217) (0.0220) (0.0288) (0.0217) (0.0208)
Workplace has 3 - 9 employees (1 = yes) -0.1229*** -0.0494*** -0.0212** -0.1230*** -0.0483*** -0.0198*
(0.0124) (0.0096) (0.0082) (0.0124) (0.0096) (0.0083)
Workplace has 10 - 24 employees (1 = yes) -0.0547*** -0.0282** -0.0019 -0.0546*** -0.0275** -0.0010
(0.0121) (0.0086) (0.0079) (0.0121) (0.0086) (0.0079)
Workplace has 25 - 49 employees (1 = yes) -0.0474*** -0.0133+ 0.0034 -0.0468*** -0.0130+ 0.0039
(0.0112) (0.0071) (0.0062) (0.0113) (0.0071) (0.0062)
Workplace has 100 - 199 employees (1 = yes) 0.0081 0.0001 0.0047 0.0080 0.0001 0.0050
(0.0117) (0.0069) (0.0064) (0.0118) (0.0069) (0.0064)
Workplace has 200 - 499 employees (1 = yes) 0.0240* 0.0122 0.0091 0.0246* 0.0127 0.0101
(0.0119) (0.0082) (0.0072) (0.0119) (0.0082) (0.0072)
Workplace has 500 - 999 employees (1 = yes) 0.0284+ 0.0257** 0.0119 0.0283+ 0.0255* 0.0126
(0.0149) (0.0099) (0.0086) (0.0150) (0.0100) (0.0087)
Workplace has 1000 or more employees (1 = yes) 0.0279* 0.0212* 0.0124 0.0285* 0.0215* 0.0127
(0.0133) (0.0101) (0.0082) (0.0134) (0.0101) (0.0082)
Constant 4.0586*** 3.1011*** 0.0320*** 4.0491*** 3.1601*** 0.0325***
(0.2315) (0.2155) (0.0051) (0.2309) (0.2094) (0.0051)
Occupation class dummies (included) (included) (included) (included) (included) (included)
Regional dummies (included) (included) (included) (included) (included) (included)
No. of Obs. 22,733 22,733 10,673 22,640 22,640 10,562
R2 0.5290 0.3300 0.0298 0.5291 0.3302 0.0283
Sig.(Model) 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Coeﬃcients, cluster-robust standard errors in parentheses. ***/**/*/+ denote signiﬁcance on the
0.1%, 1%, 5% and 10% level respectively.
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